Bloody Sunday occurred on Sunday November 21, 1920 at exactly 9 a.m. in Ireland. Collins instructed his men to attack at precisely 9 a.m. because according to him, "These whores, the British, have got to learn the Irish men can turn up on time," (Soodalter, pg. 54).
Prior to Bloody Sunday, Michael Collins had made a hit squad of twelve men called the "Squad." They all reported directly to him. He would assign them targets never out of spite, but on a political and strategic basis. With these killings and kidnappings the Squad performed, along with Collins' highly functional spy network, caused the British intelligence in Ireland to be nonexistent. So in desperation, Britain brought their best detectives positioned around the world to Ireland to repair their intelligence program. Collins found out about these men, and his intelligence agents identified them and their addresses. So Collins assigned eight teams, with a Squad member leading each, to eliminate them all on Sunday Morning November 21, 1920 at 9 a.m. There were more than twenty men on their target list.
It was not a complete success though. Nine of the targets escaped, and two of the fifteen men that were killed were just regular army officers shot by mistake. Some of the men were shot in bed or in front of their wives. These facts made people question Collins' tactics and thought that he was too brutal, but he stated, "There is no crime in detecting and destroying in wartime the spy and the informer. They have destroyed without trial. I have paid them back in their own coin," (Soodalter, pg. 55).
Still, it had the desired effect. The British could clearly see that they had underestimated the Irish rebels. One chronicler wrote, "They accepted after Bloody Sunday that they were dealing with an organized and efficient force, and so began their first efforts at negotiation," (Soodalter, pg. 55). Brutal, perhaps, but without it, England wouldn't have realized what Ireland was capable of. They then knew that they had to compromise with Ireland.
Prior to Bloody Sunday, Michael Collins had made a hit squad of twelve men called the "Squad." They all reported directly to him. He would assign them targets never out of spite, but on a political and strategic basis. With these killings and kidnappings the Squad performed, along with Collins' highly functional spy network, caused the British intelligence in Ireland to be nonexistent. So in desperation, Britain brought their best detectives positioned around the world to Ireland to repair their intelligence program. Collins found out about these men, and his intelligence agents identified them and their addresses. So Collins assigned eight teams, with a Squad member leading each, to eliminate them all on Sunday Morning November 21, 1920 at 9 a.m. There were more than twenty men on their target list.
It was not a complete success though. Nine of the targets escaped, and two of the fifteen men that were killed were just regular army officers shot by mistake. Some of the men were shot in bed or in front of their wives. These facts made people question Collins' tactics and thought that he was too brutal, but he stated, "There is no crime in detecting and destroying in wartime the spy and the informer. They have destroyed without trial. I have paid them back in their own coin," (Soodalter, pg. 55).
Still, it had the desired effect. The British could clearly see that they had underestimated the Irish rebels. One chronicler wrote, "They accepted after Bloody Sunday that they were dealing with an organized and efficient force, and so began their first efforts at negotiation," (Soodalter, pg. 55). Brutal, perhaps, but without it, England wouldn't have realized what Ireland was capable of. They then knew that they had to compromise with Ireland.